Bibi’s Gambit?

Did the October 7 Attack Happen with Netanyahu’s Blessing?

by Balder Olrik October 7, 2025

English version – Dansk version

On October 7, 2023, the world woke up to shock and horror – Israel was subjected to a massive terror attack. Approximately 4,000–6,000 Hamas fighters simultaneously breached the normally heavily guarded border. A force the size of the entire Danish army had been secretly mobilized and attacked undetected. This narrative, which in hindsight may sound too incredible to be true, was largely uncritically accepted by the public. However, a number of well-documented facts soon emerged casting a new, far more ambiguous light on Netanyahu and his inner circle’s role before and during the attack – facts that never really reached Europe, where his narrative was allowed to live unchallenged.

Netanyahu Knew But Failed to Act

The New York Times revealed already in November 2023 that Israel’s intelligence had possessed a detailed 40-page Hamas attack plan at least one year prior to the October 7, 2023 attack. The plan was translated and circulated at several levels within the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) and among intelligence officers. It described with precision rocket bombardments, drone attacks on surveillance systems at the border, and then an infiltration by armed Hamas militants via a network of routes – exactly as later occurred.
One would expect Netanyahu, upon learning of the plan, to take precautions and try to thwart this ambitious plan. Or at least to reinforce the border, having a detailed plan of how it might be breached – but none of this happened.

Funding the Attack

For years, Netanyahu – with Qatar as a donor – organized that billions of dollars were funneled directly to Hamas. The money was transferred monthly in cash via suitcases across the Israeli-controlled border. This happened with the Netanyahu government’s approval and logistical support, right up to the terrorist attack. Former Prime Ministers Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert and former Shin Bet chief Yuval Diskin have publicly criticized Netanyahu for channeling these huge sums to Hamas – money that, they said, strengthened the militant wing at the expense of the civilian population, as it ended up largely with Hamas’s military wing.
The strategy was the classic “divide and conquer,” keeping internal Palestinian divisions alive and preventing the more pragmatic and secular Fatah, dominant in the West Bank, from gaining control in Gaza. Without this massive injection of funds, the October 7 attack would not have been possible.

Storm Clouds Gathering

In the weeks leading up to the attack, Israeli surveillance units repeatedly reported extensive and worrying Hamas activity: drone training, attacks on exercise sites and models of Israeli tanks and observation towers, and hostage-taking drills – yet no one at higher levels raised an eyebrow.
Three days before the attack, international intelligence agencies sounded alarm bells. Several passed information to Israel, giving the country the opportunity to take precautions. Egypt’s president personally warned Benjamin Netanyahu of a large Hamas attack imminent – something Netanyahu later denied but which was confirmed by the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, which had also been warned.

Incomprehensible Decisions

After the warning, the IDF leadership made several baffling decisions in the following days. No initiative was taken to counter the looming attack. On the contrary, they made it as easy as possible for Hamas to carry it out – substantially increasing the risk of military and civilian casualties before the attack.

The relocation of the Nova festival with its 3,500 attendees is peculiar. The psychedelic trance festival was supposed to be held far from Gaza, but two days before the attack – the day after receiving numerous warnings – the event was moved, with IDF involvement, to an area near the border and without military protection.

Another puzzling decision was pulling the IDF’s 89th “Oz” Brigade from the Gaza border. Oz is one of Israel’s most elite and specialized units, known for complex operations along the Gaza and West Bank borders. The unit is equipped with the latest materiel and has great experience fighting irregular lightly armed enemies just like Hamas. It is considered the best qualified to prevent border breaches and attacks on Israeli territory.
The Oz Brigade was withdrawn from the Gaza border two days before October 7, leaving the task to a small, less experienced, and poorly equipped local force. The absence of Oz is highlighted in both IDF’s internal investigations and international analyses as one of the key factors in Hamas’s success.
All of this happened despite increasing reports of suspicious Hamas activity, not only by other intelligence services but also from Israel’s own units.

The Night Before the Attack

Around midnight, an unusual mass activation of Israeli SIM cards in Gaza was reported to IDF leadership. Israeli Channel 14 reported live that about 1,000 SIM cards were activated, but IDF leadership and Shin Bet chose not to react and dismissed the numbers as highly exaggerated, although the number seemed realistic given the number of Hamas fighters.

Just hours before the attack, IDF leadership received emails from bases and Shin Bet indicating clear signs of an imminent attack. The Chief of Staff was informed at 1:30 a.m., and a crisis meeting was held at approximately 3:30 a.m. However, only three drones and one attack helicopter were deployed – no increased alert or additional troop mobilization occurred.

The commander of the Gaza division that weekend, Brigadier General Avi Rosenfeld, was deeply concerned over the intelligence from Gaza. He attempted to raise the alert level along the border and surrounding communities but was instead instructed by IDF leadership not to take any ‘noisy’ measures that might alert Hamas. The reason for this remains speculative.

Possibly for that reason, at 5:20 a.m., soldiers along the border received an unusual and fatal order to cancel all patrols from 5:20 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. – exactly the period Hamas planned to attack. A survivor from the Pega outpost, Shalom Sheetrit, described before the Knesset how many of his comrades chose to go to sleep after the “strange” order. Hours later, Pega outpost was wiped out — caught literally off guard. Fourteen were killed and one kidnapped. They also failed to protect the nearby kibbutz where over 100 died.

Minimal Resistance

Between 6:30 and 7:00 a.m., Hamas breached the border at over 30 locations and sent 4,000–6,000 fighters into Israeli territory – on foot, in vehicles, motorcycles, speedboats, and paragliders. The Israeli positions were nearly undefended – about 12 soldiers per kilometer of border – and were quickly overwhelmed, encountering minimal resistance.

Massacre at Nahal Oz Base

One of the first attacks Hamas carried out inside Israel targeted Nahal Oz base, only 850 meters from the border. On that day, 23 teenage girls aged 18 to 19 served as observers for IDF’s Unit 414. Sixteen of them were killed during the attack, and seven were abducted to Gaza.
These girls were stationed to monitor the area via cameras and electronic sensors — unarmed and with no combat training. Their security thus depended entirely on their armed colleagues. According to IDF’s internal report, only one soldier was at the main gate and three in a standby unit nearby, making them extremely vulnerable to Hamas.
The same young women had repeatedly warned their superiors about unusual Hamas activity — including drone flights and large exercises near the border — in the months leading up to the attack. These warnings were ignored higher up. The lack of protection and neglect by the IDF led to immense anger among the bereaved families.

Massacre at Nova Festival

Hamas had no prior knowledge of the Nova Festival, a psychedelic trance event, when their 1st and 3rd companies from the Nuseirat Battalion accidentally encountered the festival while heading to the religious city of Netivot, their actual target. This attack resulted in the worst civilian massacre that day: 378 people were killed at the festival and nearby roads; 344 of whom were civilians, and 34 security personnel, with at least 44 abducted as hostages.
After some time at the festival, the Hamas battalion split. A smaller group stayed, others returned to Gaza with hostages, while most of the 100+ fighters continued toward Netivot, but were repelled by Israeli tanks and retreated.
The first IDF tank arrived at the festival at 8:20 a.m., but was quickly neutralized. For many hours, the festival remained undefended militarily. Significant Israeli forces arrived only around 11:35 to 11:50, about four hours after the attack began.

Hannibal Directive

According to the controversial Hannibal Directive, Israeli soldiers are obligated to open fire on their own citizens if there is a risk of their being abducted as hostages by the enemy. In practice, this meant many civilians fleeing terror were killed by heavy IDF fire — burned beyond recognition in their own vehicles. About 1,139 people were killed in Israel that day, 72% civilians. The exact number of civilians killed by friendly fire is still unclear, but UN and investigative journalists have pointed to significant civilian casualties caused by the Hannibal Directive. The IDF has stated it would not be morally proper to investigate these incidents for the sake of the soldiers who carried out the orders. Thus, for moral reasons, they refuse to investigate their own actions. To grasp the tragedy’s extent, we must understand that IDF prefers a dead Israeli over a hostage.

What Was Achieved?

The IDF succeeded in protecting Netivot — Netanyahu’s political and religious heartland, home to large haredi yeshiva institutions and communities. The military presence there was so strong that Hamas terrorists were deterred.
On the other hand, the participants at the Nova Festival were the big losers — a festival moved only two days earlier between Netivot and the Gaza border.

Slow and Weak Response

The IDF’s response to the Hamas attack on October 7 was notably slow and ineffective, well documented in official investigations. The Israeli Air Force’s own report stated preparedness was at a historic low, sharply contrasting with normal capacity.
Initial requests for air support were denied, and actual airstrikes against attacking Hamas forces began only hours after the assault started. Most of the army was on leave or deployed in the West Bank that weekend, leading to slow mobilization as the army was effectively dormant that day. This allowed thousands of Hamas fighters to operate almost unhindered. This slow response directly contributed to high civilian casualties and destruction occurring in the attack’s first hours and days.

Who Helped Hamas with Intelligence?

After the attack, it quickly became clear that Hamas had deeply detailed knowledge of Israeli military installations along the border. This led to calls for an independent inquiry. Netanyahu and several government members have stated publicly that “a real investigation can only begin after the war with Hamas has ended.” This has repeatedly drawn criticism and accusations of intentionally dragging out investigations to avoid responsibility.

Why?

No one doubts that Hamas carried out the horrific terror attack, but it is also certain that Israel’s top leadership possessed ample knowledge about what would happen and had the means to stop it – yet made decisions that worsened the outcome. Though these facts are widely known among Israelis, many choose to believe the official explanations blaming confusion, misreading, arrogance, or chance.
The question remains whether we should also believe Netanyahu or if he played a gambit — a chess move sacrificing one of his own pieces early for a strategic advantage that could lead to victory. More than a thousand innocent Israelis might have been sacrificed to later legitimize and rally popular support for Gaza’s destruction and its population. A classic move from the playbook of power, legitimizing countless despots.

Selected Sources

On the Hamas attack plan

On funding transfers to Hamas

On ignored warnings

On Egyptian Warnings

On the Strange Order

On the Nova Festival

On Netanyahu’s Hamas Strategy

Secondary Sources